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Summary
Although globalization has been going on for quite a time, after 1970 it took new 
forms. Foreign direct investments were made in increasing amounts just to optimize 
the value chains of large transnational companies. The activities requiring unskilled 
workers were outsourced to underdeveloped peripheral countries like China, Viet-
nam and Malaysia in Asia, and after 1990, to Romania, Slovakia or Hungary in Central 
and Eastern Europe. At the same time the activities that require skilled and high-
quality labour were kept in Western Europe. TNCs made profits on the difference 
between the low wages paid in peripheral countries and high prices charged in devel-
oped ones. Although it seemed that globalization cannot be stopped, a new develop-
ment, robotisation might slow down or even completely stop this process: why should 
a company outsource any activity to a faraway developing country and transport goods 
for thousands of miles if they can use relatively cheaper robots at home, close to the 
key markets? Robots may be considerably cheaper and more disciplined than any 
human worker in a cheap-labour country. Robotisation has significant economic and 
social consequences, as the budget revenues of governments might decline, as a large 
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part of government revenues comes from taxes levied on wages. With significantly 
less workers the budget revenue is reduced. In Hungary the results of heavy taxes 
on labour (to a minor extent, personal income taxes and more importantly, social 
security contributions) are felt, as the discrepancy between net and gross wages is too 
high, and thus when the EU labour market opened up to Hungarian workers, nearly 
half a million Hungarians (around 10% of the active population) left the country for 
Western Europe. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: H25, H30, H51, H72
Keywords: fiscalisation, globalization, robotisation, competitiveness, social security, 
Scandinavian countries, healthcare system
Definition and the various aspects of globalization
In 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified four basic aspects of glo-
balization: 
– international trade and transactions, 
– international movement of capital and investment,
– migration (movement of people), and 
– international dissemination of knowledge (IMF, 2000).
We might suppose that, after the emergence of the technological, legal and cultur-
al preconditions, economic globalization moves first and is followed by other aspects 
of globalizations, but it is not always true: political problems might slow down or even 
completely stop economic globalization. Political conditions can also be regarded as 
the precondition to and result of economic globalization.
How to measure the level of economic globalization?
Economic globalization is generally regarded as the rapid growth of
– foreign trade,
– foreign investments,
– international mobility of labour force.
The periods when these factors develop more rapidly than GDP can be regarded 
as the Tides of Globalization, and when they develop less rapidly that GDP, as the Ebbs 
of Globalization (Katona, Árva and Schlett, 2013).
There are different ways of measuring the ebbs and tides of globalization. There 
are more precise and complicated, and there are simpler but more easily measurable 
methods. One of the most elegant measurements of globalization was worked out by 
the Centre for the Study of Globalization at the Warwick University (Warwick, 2017). 
This elaborate system measures the economic, political and cultural aspects of glo- 
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balization and creates a synthetic index (called “CSGR index”) by assigning various 
weights to the different measurements. This index is rather complicated and has an 
elegant mathematical background. The value of CSGR is normalized between 0 and 1, 
and the higher values are assigned to the higher level of globalization. Unfortunately, 
the CSGR value has been computed only for a rather short period between 1982 and 
2004, due to a lack of available and reliable data.
So, although we have a good and elegant globalization index, it is often useless 
for historical analyses as does not cover a sufficiently long period. Unfortunately, the 
CSGR index only includes relatively short and highly unreliable time series. More im-
portantly, the most recent CSGR index relates to 2004, and so it is rather old. For this 
reason, it is more advisable to look at less sophisticated, although perhaps less perfect, 
indices, like the Long-Term Globalization Index of Angus Maddison, which compares 
the growth of international trade to GDP growth rate. A few years are also missing 
from these data, although Maddison made tremendous efforts at collecting long-term 
economic data from different countries. 
When GDP grows more rapidly, than international trade, economic growth is fast-
er than trade growth, this is an ebb in globalization, and a period when trade develops 
more rapidly can be regarded as a tide in globalization. The figures collected and 
computed by Angus Maddison (2007) suggest about 3 tides and 2 ebbs in globaliza-
tion throughout economic history.
Table 1: Stages of globalization
Average 
annual growth 
in world trade
Average annual 
GDP growth
Annual average GDP growth to 
average trade growth
1500–1820 0.98 0.32
3.0 
1st TIDE (the EBB was perhaps 
between 1750 and 1820, but 
data are insufficient)
1820–1870 4.18 0.94
4.4 
2nd TIDE
1870–1813 3.40 2.12
1.6 
2nd TIDE (slower)
1913–1950 0.90 1.82
0.5 
2nd EBB
1950–1973 7.88 4.90
1.6 
A small TIDE
1973–2003 5.38 3.17
1.7 
3rd TIDE
1820–2003 3.97 2.25
1.8 
TIDEs and EBBs together
Source: Maddison, 2007, p. 81, with the author’s remarks
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Stages of globalization
According to various globalization theories, globalization takes place in consecutive 
stages. By the most widespread theories (Benichi, 2007, or Katona, Árva and Schlett, 
2013), economic globalization started in the 16th century with the great geographical 
discoveries, continued during the “long 19th century”, approximately between 1789 
and World War I, and currently we are undergoing the third wave (Berger, 2003). In 
the 15th and 16th centuries, mainly rare and precious raw materials have attracted 
foreign trade and foreign investments and drove infrastructure development abroad 
(harbours, roads, etc.). It is interesting that the intensive tides in globalization slowly 
faded away in the 18th century, mainly because of the long and merciless wars that 
tore Europe: the Eighty Years’ War, the Nine Years’ War, the Seven Years’ War, the 
Napoleonic Wars, and many others.
In the 19th century the picture changed drastically. According to Berger’s research, 
the 19th century can be regarded as the forerunner of the current economic globali-
zation, with foreign investments and even some transnational companies. Market buy-
ing investments appeared and a few transnational companies were launched before 
the end of “the long 19th century”, as the devastating and long 1914 war stopped 
globalization abruptly (Berger, 2003). 
Note that even a few years before the “Great War” that started in 1914, several 
economists considered it highly improbable to have armed conflicts in Europe. As 
Norman Angell, the famous columnist of The Economist wrote in an article, and later 
in his popular book entitled The Great Illusion (Angell, 1911) that “war is economi-
cally and socially irrational and wars between industrial countries are useless because 
conquest did not pay”. He also added that even if there would be a war in Europe, it 
would be short. He argued that the “economic interdependence” of nations (in other 
words, globalization) is the “guarantee of lasting peace”.
All we know is that this bright future has never arrived, and in 1914 not only a 
bloody and disastrous war started, but the glorious years of 19th-century globalization 
had quickly came to a long-lasting standstill.
The Great War ended in 1918, but the political and economic conditions were still 
unripe for a return to original level of globalization. On the one hand, small nation 
states were created in Europe to replace former large Germany, the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and of the Ottoman (Turkish) empire. Russia was transformed by the Bol-
shevik revolution to a country moving towards economic isolation and autarchy. In 
addition to all these political stresses, in 1929 a great economic crisis swept over the 
world. With the beginning of World War II in 1939, all hopes of returning to pre-war 
globalization were lost.
Globalization after World War II
After World War II, the world was divided into three distinct groups of countries, each 
following a different way of development.
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1) Developed market economies wanted to re-establish free trade and free capital 
movement, i.e. the traditional globalization.
2) The Soviet Union and the socialist bloc surrounding it became increasingly iso-
lated and formed an autarchic group of countries rejecting globalization.
3) The newly independent colonies, called “developing countries”, were in be-
tween the two larger groups and have called themselves “Third World, or Non-Aligned 
Countries”, and this country group was not very enthusiastic on globalization either.
Western Europe and the globalization after 1945
After World War II, due to the losses suffered during the World Wars, there was a 
serious shortage in labour force in Western Europe. As a high number of men died 
during the wars, the manufacturing industry, which was rapidly growing after the war, 
was seriously short of labour.
The solution for that problem was admitting people to Western Europe from the 
colonies (or after 1960, rather from the former colonies) and employ them in the 
newly built and rapidly developing factories.
Millions of people arrived in Western Europe from Africa and Asia and were em-
ployed in the automotive industry, in manufacturing household appliances, etc. This 
policy worked till the end of the 20th century, when new economic, cultural and polit-
ical developments started to cause serious problems in these countries. They included 
demands for equal pays to the recently arrived workers to those indigenous in Europe, 
and protests against the rejection and seclusion of immigrants, or the descendants 
of immigrants, by the native majority, which (not surprisingly) caused negative senti-
ments. Slowly but steadily, these increased tensions.
The developed countries made enormous efforts at re-launching globalization, 
and so this period saw the creation of the most important international economic or-
ganisations, as the World Bank Group, the IMF, the GATT, the UNCTAD, and others. 
This was also the time of establishing the European Economic Union, the predecessor 
of the European Union.
Socialist countries outside globalization
The socialist countries were nearly completely excluded from the globalization process as 
they blatantly refused it. In addition to distancing themselves, these countries openly reject-
ed all forms of the market economy, especially international capitalism. Globalization was 
the worst idea for the politicians of the socialist countries. They wanted to develop on their 
own, from their own resources, and the use of foreign credit was rejected for a long time.
Globalization and the so-called “developing countries”
The underdeveloped former colonial countries (politely termed “developing coun-
tries” after independence had been won) also tended to reject globalization as they 
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suspected the manipulations of their former colonialists in this idea. They national-
ized foreign-owned assets in agriculture, industry and trade, and decided to set out 
on their own economic development, without strong ties with the former colonizers. 
These countries followed the “developmental state strategy”, elaborated in Latin 
America by Celso Furtado and Raúl Prebisch, the most important economists of the 
third-world countries, which relies on the “centre-periphery” theory and advocates 
“protectionist and state assisted” industrialization. 
The starting point of the idea is highly rational: in the 19th century Latin America 
had a traditionally important trade with Western Europe. Latin American countries 
exported raw materials (mainly food) to Europe and they bought manufactured 
goods from Europe. But after 1914 this model suddenly collapsed with the war. Trade 
was blocked during the war by German submarines and after the war by the ensu-
ing economic difficulties, including the Economic Crisis of 1929-1933. After 1939, 
World War II repeatedly halted trade between Latin America and Western Europe. As 
all these difficulties nearly completely destroyed trade with Europe, Raoul Prebisch 
maintained (Prebisch, 1950) that it was important for Latin America to start indus-
trialization on its own. He argued that industrialization should be promoted by the 
state. Similar models were applied after 1960 in South-East Asia, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, etc. fairly successfully. Frequently, experts 
from even socialist countries visited third-world countries to help their industrializa-
tion efforts.
Drawbacks of state-organised industrialization
It was often maintained that state-assisted industrialization might cause corruption 
and a close cooperation between the political and economic elites, where only those 
can succeed who enjoy support from the political ruling class. This is often called 
“crony capitalism”, a term coined in the Philippines during the Marcos regime and 
credited to business editor George M. Taber of the Time magazine, who first used it 
for the Philippines in an article in the April 21, 1980 issue called “The Age of Crony 
Capitalism” (Hau, 2017). Taber maintained that state-assisted industrialization is the 
hotbed of corruption and is consequently biasing the distribution and efficiency of 
resources. Others argued that the case was just the opposite: without active state par-
ticipation and help, efficient industrialization is impossible in underdeveloped coun-
tries. 
Unfortunately, convincing empirical examples or even econometric results are un-
available to support any of these opposing statements, and further research is needed 
in this field.
Increasing state deficits due to state-assisted industrialization in the 1970s
State-assisted industrialization efforts were generally financed from state revenues and 
credits, a large part borrowed from abroad. By the end of the 1960s the majority of de-
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veloping countries had accumulated huge debts to invest in industrial development. 
In that decade no one was worried about its increase, as it was taken for granted that 
industrialization would create the capacities required for repayment. 
However, during the 1970s, the pointless US spending on the Vietnam War, the 
powerful wage demands of the British Trade Unions, the oil price hikes after the 
OPEC crude oil embargo following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, and the declining oil 
supply due to the war between Iran and Iraq ran the world economy into a formerly 
unknown phenomenon: stagflation, which is a state of economic stagnation with in-
creasing prices.1 Latin America was extremely severely hit by the crisis, as these coun-
tries had already been heavily indebted: between 1975 and 1982 Latin American debt 
to commercial banks increased at a cumulative annual rate of 20.4 percent. External 
debt of Latin America rose from USD 75 billion in 1975 to more than USD 315 billion 
in 1983, or 50 percent of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP). 
The problems of these countries only aggravated when in 1979 the Fed decided 
to increase the interest rate. In addition to making it more difficult to borrow money, 
it also rapidly increased debt service. The exchange rates of Latin American curren-
cies started to depreciate, as current account problems deteriorated. As a result of 
depreciation to the US dollar, Latin American governments ended up owning tre-
mendous quantities of valueless national currencies. The contraction of world trade 
in 1981 caused the prices of their major export products, the primary resources, to 
fall. Third-world countries were thrust to the brink of bankruptcy by the middle of 
the 1980s.
A “solution” for the debt crisis: the Washington Consensus
Among these circumstances, the USA made an “Irresistible Offer” to the Latin Ameri-
can countries: this was the famous Washington Consensus, suggested by the US ad-
ministration’s Washington think tanks and from the IMF experts, and were edited by 
John Williamson, an economist from the Institute for International Economics, an 
international economic organisation, based in Washington D.C. (Williamson, 1989). 
The most important topics of the Washington Consensus were privatisation, deregula-
tion and the liberalisation of FDIs. 
The message, after a brief hesitation, was well received by the heavily indebted 
developing countries: these economies were opened up to foreign investors and priva-
tisation began. Not surprisingly, in 1990 the former socialist countries were given the 
same advice, and followed it enthusiastically.
Globalization at the end of the 20th century
Clearly, globalization was largely driven by foreign direct investments and the rising 
foreign trade. The end of the 20th century saw the peak of the third tide of globali-
zation and foreign direct investment. The major causes of a rise in globalization in-
cluded the following:
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– The legal conditions of FDI become free of constraints in the third world and in 
the former socialist countries.
– The freedom of foreign trade had increased.
– Transportation and communication developed rapidly.
– There was a relative political stability during the cold war.
During the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century foreign direct invest-
ments was primarily made in order to purchase market shares (“market buying invest-
ments”) in rich countries situated close to markets. A minor amount of investments 
were made in developing countries to obtain resources and raw materials (crude oil, 
coal, and special materials required for metallurgy or for the computer industry) 
(“resource buying investments”). Investments in extraction industries were generally 
implemented in Africa, in the Middle East or in Latin America, in relatively poor 
countries. 
But by the end of the 20th century, new tendencies had emerged: as rich countries 
paying relatively higher wages were no longer competitive in low added value assem-
bling, these activities were often outsourced from the centre to the peripheries, to 
developing countries with low wages. Through outsourcing companies realized com-
petitive advantages. “Offshore outsourcing investments” had become the most impor-
tant form of FDI by the end of the 20th century and contributed considerably to glo-
balization, as modern technology and brand-new products arrived in underdeveloped 
countries. Transnational Companies (TNCs) made profits on the differences between 
the low wages paid in the countries where production was performed and the high 
wages, and consequently higher prices, in their markets in the developed countries.
Naturally, traditional “market buying investments”, which first appeared at the end 
of the 19th century, and the “colonial type investments”, made primarily to obtain raw 
materials and serve energy generation, have also survived. In addition, another type 
called “state subsidy hunting” investments also emerged, as governments, eager to at-
tract as much foreign direct investment as possible, began a “race to the bottom”, i.e. 
to provide generous tax cuts and even subsidies to foreign investors. 
Hungary in the whirlwind of globalization
After 1990, Hungary was rapidly globalized. Privatisation included the sale of state-
owned enterprises to foreign strategic investors, and in addition, greenfield invest-
ments also entered Hungary. In the CSGS Index of the Warwick University Hungary 
rather high. (Figure 1)
Note that in this Complex Globalization Index, Hungary ranked 14th of 135 coun-
tries in 2004. Unfortunately, more recent data are unavailable for the Globalization In-
dex. In view of the developments of the past few years, the overall picture probably has 
not changed, although perhaps Hungary’s Globalization index might has diminished.
As the promises of globalization, namely, rapid economic development and uni-
versally improving living standards, have not been fulfilled, a relatively strong anti-glo-
balist sentiment has emerged in Hungary at the beginning of the 21st century. A few
283
Civic Review · Vol. 14, Special Issue, 2018
Figure 1: Economic Globalisation Index (score) 2004 
0,000
0,200
0,400
0,600
0,800
1,000
1,200
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
N
et
h
er
la
n
ds
 A
n
ti
lle
s
Si
n
ga
p
or
e
H
on
g 
K
on
g,
 C
h
in
a
Ir
el
an
d
M
al
ay
si
a
B
el
gi
um
G
uy
an
a
Sw
az
ila
n
d
T
h
ai
la
n
d
A
n
go
la
B
ah
ra
in
H
un
ga
ry
M
al
ta
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
M
ol
do
va
E
st
on
ia
U
kr
ai
n
e
C
on
go
, R
ep
.
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formerly privatised companies have been re-nationalized and the government sup-
ports local Hungarian businesses in developing their capacities. This was somewhat 
similar to the above-mentioned state-assisted industrialization seen in the third-
world. 
Factors working against globalization at the end of the 20th century
Certain factors worked against globalization towards the end of the 20th century, 
such as:
1) The copying of high-tech European and US products in China jeopardised the 
technological monopoly of companies in rich core countries.
2) Inequality increased all over the world (Credit Suisse, 2017) and triggered anti-
globalization sentiments.
3) Nationalist sentiments in target countries (in Latin America and some South 
Asian countries) fuelled anti-globalization movements.
4) The unfulfilled or broken promises of globalization evoked anti-globalist atti-
tudes in the former socialist countries.
5) In capital exporting countries fears also led to protectionism in the interests of 
the local labour force (note President Trump’s measures).
However, these factors were superseded by economic interests, and offshore out-
sourcing has continued up to this day, although the 2008 economic crisis slowed it 
down (UNCTAD, 2017). Yet another factor that has put globalization at risk is tech-
nological development.
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Is this the end of globalization? 
Is technological development, namely robotisation, the ultimate cause of the possible 
demise of globalization?
Technological development has already started to pave the way to the end of off-
shore outsourcing and globalization. Globalization was hard hit by the emergence of 
robotics, as the use of robots in assembling will render offshore outsourcing point-
less: robots are much cheaper and more precise than the cheapest and most precise 
workers in any developing country. Consequently, in the early 21st century, offshore 
outsourcing and foreign direct investment has become economically useless and ir-
rational.
Robotisation also has unpleasant consequences. First of all, as lot of experts have 
pointed out, the use of robots reduces employment. It is a major concern who will buy 
the newly produced goods if workers’ headcount falls. Another point mentioned by 
Krugman back in 2012 is that GDP would be distributed even more unequally than 
now, as the share of labour would decline, and so rich people will get richer, while the 
poor will sank into deeper poverty. A similar remark was made by labour economist 
Richard Freeman (2016) in his paper titled “Who Owns the Robots Rules the World”, 
arguing that most people’s jobs are at the risk of becoming robotized or otherwise 
automated.
The use of robots will also jeopardise the functioning of social security systems and 
welfare states in Europe (elsewhere we can hardly find anything similar to welfare 
state or social security system). Robots do not pay taxes and social security contribu-
tions. Currently, social security and welfare expenditures are financed from charges 
on wages, but if robots make workers redundant, unemployment will also increase in 
developed countries. Developing countries, the traditional targets of offshore out-
sourcing, are in a fare more serious trouble. Immigration to rich countries would be 
accelerated by the increase in unemployment resulting from the drying up of capi-
tal flows to developing countries. These problems are further aggravated by climate 
change in the Middle East and in Africa. 
Social and economic conclusions of the new developments of Globalization:  
melt down of state revenues
As we have seen, Globalization has entered into a new phase after the 1970s as the 
answer to the new problems was offshore outsourcing. The results of this offshore 
outsourcing were important for the economy, as 
– it has made possible to reduce costs of production,
– products and services were sold in the rich developed countries,
– the profit was realised in the industrialised, rich countries,
– tax revenues of the countries all over the World have diminished radically due to 
transfer pricing and corporate tax reductions provided or Foreign Direct Investors in 
order to attract more investments into the poorer countries.
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Transfer pricing means that transnational companies are “optimizing” overall cor-
porate taxes by modifying prices of their services and goods circulating between dif-
ferent units of the TNCs. Consequently, tax revenues of the states were melting down. 
State revenues could only be rebuilt by collecting state revenues through relatively 
new (“unorthodox”) taxes, like VAT, as it was made in Hungary after 2010.2
At the same time technological development seems to destroy the very bases of 
globalisation. Use of artificial intelligence and the spread of robotization had made 
offshore outsources rather useless. But the collapse of globalisation might also cause 
grave problems for the states. One of the major consequences is the possible collapse 
of the budgetary revenues of the poorer countries, which were relying heavily on taxes 
charged on wages.
High wage taxes are already causing grave problems in Europe and especially in Hungary3
Hungary ranks 60th in the World Economic Forum’s 2017-2018 World Competitive-
ness Report (World Economic Forum, 2017), which identifies five major causes for 
this disappointing performance:
1) Inadequately educated workforce;
2) Corruption;
3) Tax rates;
4) Tax regulations;
5) Access to financing;
6) Instability in policies.
Not surprisingly, taxation (including rates and regulations) is high on the list. The 
Hungarian tax wedge are almost the highest in Europe, currently next only to Bel-
gium. “Tax wedge is defined as the ratio between the amount of taxes paid by an 
average single worker (a single person at 100% of average earnings) without children 
and the corresponding total labour cost for the employer. The average tax wedge 
measures the extent to which tax on labour income discourages employment. This 
indicator is measured in percentage of labour cost” (OECD).
The consequences of a high tax wedge in Hungary are disappointing:
1) Differences between net and gross wages are very high.
2) Nearly half a million Hungarian workers, approximately 10% of the active popu-
lation,4 have left the country to work in Western Europe.
3) SMEs are in a competitive disadvantage, as foreign-owned large TNC’s gener-
ally sell their products in Western Europe, where purchasing power is considerably 
higher, and consequently, higher prices can be charged. In Hungary social security 
contributions do not hinder TNC’s activities.
4) SMEs are often compelled to try to evade taxes, and so they simply do not reg-
ister their employees or register them at considerably lower wages than actually paid.
5) Employees unregistered for social security are frequently ineligible for healthcare.
6) Workers registered at lower-than-actual wages will not receive proper pension 
when they retire.
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Figure 2:  Average tax wedge for a single person at 100% of the average wage (AW) in the 
private sector (excluding children) 
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Although in the past few years, the Hungarian government has made efforts to re-
duce the tax wedge by lowering certain social security charges, the outcome remains 
unconvincing and rather haphazard. The measures taken so far have not clarified or 
simplified the taxation regime as a whole.
Solution for the high tax wedges and for the disappearance of budget revenues from wages 
taxes: the Scandinavian method of healthcare financing
As shown above, the traditional financing of social security (when either the employee, 
or/and the employer pay charges to finance healthcare, pension and the unemploy-
ment benefits) causes difficulties by increasing the gap between net and gross salaries, 
and might incite tax evasion and/or emigration.
Fortunately, for this problem there is a solution that has worked fairly well in the 
past few decades in some Western European countries. It is called the “Scandinavian 
method of healthcare financing”.
In the UK and in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) the 
healthcare system is financed from the general budget instead of taxes levied on wages. 
The term generally used for this method is “fiscalisation”, but for political marketing 
reasons I suggest replacing it with the expression “Scandinavian healthcare financing”.5
In this proposal we deliberately were not speaking on the pension system, as it 
would be extremely difficult and even politically counterproductive to finance pen-
sions from the general budget. People generally would like to keep the “transforma-
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tion rate” of pensions around 1 (what means that after retiring they would like to have 
more or less the same amount of revenue as they had before).
What about the pension system?
Employees want to enjoy pensions almost as high as their wages or salaries (i.e. at a 
conversion rate5 around one). Despite the serious problems the various pension plans 
are facing, they are beyond the scope of this study.
Benefits and costs of the Scandinavian method of healthcare financing
Financing healthcare from the central budget might offer the following benefits:
– The difference between net and gross wages would decrease.
– The evasion of social security contributions would become pointless.
– Emigration would slow down.
Scandinavian healthcare financing is efficient: in the WHO’s list of the world’s 
health systems, in the year 2000, the UK, Sweden, Finland and Denmark ranked 18th, 
27th, 31st and 34th, respectively. Hungary ranked the 66th (Boyle, 2011; WHO, 2000). 
This clearly shows that a different method of financing would not ruin Hungarian 
healthcare, provided that the government does not cut healthcare spending in the 
central budget but rather increase it.
Costs of the Scandinavian healthcare financing is also a factor which should be 
taken into account, but according to our calculations (see: Arva, et al, 2017), “only” 
HUF 1100-1300 billion is required for the transformation of healthcare financing. 
Naturally, this is not “new money”, as it is also collected from taxpayers, but in a dif-
ferent way. As in 2016, Hungary’s GDP was HUF 35,420,320 million, and in 2017 it 
was around HUF 36,482,930 million, the required sum is less than 3% of the coun-
try’s GDP. This means that the “Scandinavisation” of the Hungarian healthcare sys-
tem can be implemented within a few years, it merely requires a political decision. 
But this transformation might be regarded as an important step in order to save an 
important public service in Hungary and avoid financial crisis of the state in the com-
ing years.
Notes
1  Naturally, it was a cost-push inflation which was impossible to cure by the traditional Keynesian demand 
reducing efforts.
2  In Hungary in order to obtain adequate tax revenues, after 2010 the new government has introduced 
exceptionally high VAT rates, in some cases over 27%, as it was rightly hope that it is relatively more dif-
ficult to avoid VAT than corporate and income taxes.
3  We already analysed this problem in detail (in Hungarian) a few months ago, in the Hungarian journal 
Valóság (Árva, Giday and Mádi, 2017). This is a summary of the major findings.
4  It is not surprising that mainly young and educated people with an entrepreneurial attitude have left 
Hungary and this is a rather important liability for Hungarian economic development in the long run. 
5  “Scandinavia” has a positive, but “fiscalisation” a far less positive connotation in Hungary.
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